The results confirm that the anti-inflationary benefit of central bank independence is not constant but rather depends on every variable in the broader political-economic environment to which wholly autonomous central banks and governments would respond differently. Conversely, the inflationary impacts of all such political-economic variables depend on the degree of central bank independence.
The results confirm that the anti-inflationary benefit of central bank independence is not constant but rather depends on every variable in the broader political-economic environment to which wholly autonomous central banks and governments would respond differently. Conversely, the inflationary impacts of all such political-economic variables depend on the degree of central bank independence.
Introduction
Political scientists and economists generally agree that central bank independence lowers inflation. Both also define central bank independence as the degree of autonomy of the conservative central bank from the political authority in making monetary policy. From the political scientist's view, central banks are bureaucratic institutions, populated by financial experts who are usually hawkish on inflation, whether socialized to that view or coming from population-groups with those interests. Contrarily, governments, especially democratic governments, are more responsive to various societal pressures favoring inflation. Only the most conservative of governments would be as anti-inflationary as the bank itself, so delegation of monetary-policy authority to the central bank reduces inflation. From the neoclassical economist's view, monetary policy involves a time-1 From economics, see Gordon (1983a, 1983b) , Rogoff (1985) , Lohmann (1992) , Cukierman (1992) , and Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) . From political science, see Hirsch and Goldthorpe (1978) , Beck (1984) , Woolley (1984) , Lindberg and Maier (1985) , Mayer (1990) , and Goodman (1992) . Cf. Posen (1995a Posen ( , 1995b who argues essentially that central bank independence is epiphenomenal, being produced by other anti-inflationary forces that also produce low inflation. 2 inconsistency problem (described below) which produces an inflationary bias if a government responsive to societal pressures controls monetary policy. Credible delegation of monetary-policy authority to an independent and conservative central bank can serve as a commitment device circumventing the time-inconsistency problem and therefore the inflationary bias. Thus, central bank independence lowers inflation. 1 This paper stresses the simple point that the monetary-policy-making autonomy of central banks is, by definition, a matter of degree. Independence from political authority can never be complete because the bank's authority derives from statutes or constitutional provisions, either of which the political authority can change if the bank's policies were to become sufficiently distasteful. Nor is independence ever completely absent. Administering and monitoring monetary policy is costly, politically and economically, because banks enjoy expertise and/or informational advantages over governments and because time and other resources are required for governments to monitor banks. Thus, governments cannot costlessly ensure that central banks conduct policy precisely according to their current will. Accordingly, central bank independence must refer to how far the bank could stray from the current government's desires before the latter would prefer to pay the costs of altering the bank law or of seizing the monetary reins itself (see Lohmann 1992) . Therefore, monetary policy and thus inflation are always partially controlled by central banks and partially by current governments.
Four conclusions follow. First, observed inflation will be a convex combination of the inflation rate that would prevail if the conservative central bank credibly and completely 2 For theoretical and empirical criticism of the model's real-economy implications, see Hall (1994) , Franzese (1997) , Iversen (1998b) , Hall and Franzese (1998) , Cukierman and Lippi (1997) , and Iversen and Soskice (1997) .
3 autonomously controlled monetary policy and the inflation rate that would prevail if instead the current government controlled monetary policy wholly uninfluenced by the bank, with the degree of central bank independence indicating the weight on the former rate. This implies, second, that the anti-inflationary impact of central bank independence cannot be constant, as typically estimated previously, but rather must vary with the broader political-economic environment in which the bank operates-e.g., the anti-inflationary impact of central bank independence should be greater under left than under right governments. The converses are also implied-e.g., the difference between inflation under left and right governments should decrease in the degree of central bank independence. Thus, third, because their political-economic environments differ, central bank independence will be more advantageous on anti-inflationary grounds in some country-times than others, suggesting that increases or decreases in central bank independence will be more likely in some country-times than others, ceteris paribus. Finally, these specific arguments about central bank independence illustrate a broader point regarding institutional political economy: the effects of any given institution are contextual; they depend on the configuration of other political, economic, structural, and institutional features of the setting in which the institution in question interacts.
The next section introduces the monetary-policy model from which the neoclassical view of central bank independence and inflation derives. This expositional choice indicates neither agreement nor disagreement with the neoclassical model and, especially, implies no claims regarding that model's prediction that central bank independence has no real-economy effects (e.g., on unemployment) on average.
2 I follow the neoclassical economic exposition for its familiarity, internal cohesion, and clarity, and to demonstrate that even the relatively sparse neoclassical model 3 See Cukierman (1992, ch. 3) for the standard formal economic model.
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concludes that anti-inflationary impact of central bank independence depends on the broader political-economic configuration in which the bank interacts. The third section explains how to model that interactive prediction empirically and estimates such models from a time-series-crosssection of annual GDP-deflator inflation-rates in 18 developed democracies in the flexibleexchange-rate era . The fourth section discusses the results substantively, using them to illustrate a range of further implications emerging from this fuller understanding of the theory of central bank independence and inflation and this better match of the empirical model thereto.
Central bank independence and inflation: the neoclassical model
Given nominal and real rigidities in the economy, the monetary-policy authority has an incentive to create "surprise" inflation, thereby lowering real wages (prices), and thus spurring employment (output). The private sector is, however, aware of this incentive and incorporates its inflationary consequences into their wage and price setting. Accordingly, in rational-expectations equilibrium, the monetary authority cannot systematically surprise the private sector, so real wages (prices) and therefore employment (output) are unaffected on average while inflation is higher. If, by contrast, the monetary-policy authority could credibly commit to refrain from creating such surprise inflation, private-sector actors could set lower wage (price) increases without fear. Credible commitment, then, lowers inflation without affecting real wages (prices), and thus without affecting employment (output), on average. Institutionalizing a conservative central bank with substantial independence from political authority is held to provide such credibility for the monetary authority.
Therefore, central bank independence reduces inflation without adverse real effects on average. Thus, the neoclassical argument equates central bank autonomy from political authority with monetary-policy credibility and conservatism and so concludes that central bank independence 5 lowers inflation without real effects on average. The conclusion regarding the absence of realeconomy effects is now contested (see note 2), but the conclusion that central bank independence lowers inflation remains relatively noncontentious (but cf. Posen 1995a (but cf. Posen , 1995b . If central banks are generally more anti-inflationary than governments, if central bank independence is defined as the bank's degree of monetary-policy-making autonomy from the current government, and if some effective autonomy is indeed possible, then central bank independence lowers inflation.
The empirical literature establishing a generally negative relationship between central bank independence and inflation is extensive. The typical procedure simply regresses postwar averages of inflation across some set of countries on some index of central bank independence. Occasionally some controls are added and/or the data are temporally disaggregated somewhat, but rarely has the relationship between central bank independence and inflation been estimated as anything other than linear-additive (see, e.g., Alesina and Summers 1993, and Eijffinger and De Haan 1996) . Recently, some have begun to move beyond the simplest linear-additive models, examining the interaction of central bank independence with government partisanship (Jonsson 1995 , Simmons 1995 , and Clark et al. 1998 or with labor-market organization (Hall and Franzese 1998, and Iversen 1998a Points (ii) and (iv) suggest that, because labor-market institutions alter the real-effectiveness of monetary-policy and/or the natural rate of employment, they also modify the anti-inflationary impact of central bank independence. For example, Cukierman (1992, 39-42) notes that, in the neoclassical model, the incentive to create surprise inflation and therefore the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary-policy only exist to the degree real wages are excessive so that employment is demand determined. He suggests further that, given some monopoly power, unions can achieve real wages that exceed the market-clearing rate. Thus, he concludes, union power lowers the natural rate of employment and so increases discretionary inflation. Alternatively, consider the coordinatedwage-bargaining arguments (e.g., Lange 1984 , Cameron 1984 , Bruno and Sachs 1987 , Calmfors and Driffill 1988 , Soskice 1990 , Layard et al. 1991 , and Calmfors 1993 . Unlike union power without coordination, coordinated bargaining produces real-wage restraint, not excessiveness, because encompassing wage-bargaining units internalize the employment costs associated with excessive wage-settlements whereas fragmented bargaining units can partially externalize them. Therefore, 4 Calmfors and Driffill (1988) predict a curvilinear relation between wage restraint and wage-bargaining concentration; I separate that into two opposite linear relations. Union power, as defined by Cukierman (1992) and measured here by union density, increases monopoly-power and so reduces wage restraint. Bargaining coordination, as defined by Soskice (1990) and measured here by Hall and Franzese's (1998) index fosters internalization of externalities and so increases restraint. Soskice (1990) and Layard et al. (1991) similarly disaggregate the CalmforsDriffill "hump" with empirically satisfactory results. Like the broad prediction that central bank independence lowers inflation, none of these more specific predictions is unique to neoclassical theory. The point here is more general: however one derives the models of the inflation rate that prevails if the government completely controls monetary policy and of that which prevails if instead the central bank has unmitigated control, theories of central bank independence and inflation predict that actual, observed inflation will be a convex combination of those two polar-cases. That convex-combinatorial form implies further that the inflation effect of central bank independence is not constant, as implicit in previous empirical specifications, but rather depends on everything that affects governments' and banks' desired inflation policies differently. I highlight partisanship, labor-market institutions, and international exposure and conditions in this regard; others might focus, say, on government stability or electoral incentives for macroeconomic manipulation (Nordhaus 1975) . Regardless, the more inflationary the politically responsive government relative to the conservative central bank, the greater the anti-inflationary impact of central bank independence. Conversely, other factors's inflationary impacts are greatest (least) when central bank independence is low (high).
Finally, consider the contention of some that central bank independence is epiphenomenal in inflation determination. For example, Posen (1995a Posen ( , 1995b argues that "effective financial opposition to inflation" causes both low inflation and high central bank independence. Properly controlling for financial-sector influence, he argues, central bank independence has no antiinflationary impact. However, while powerful financial opposition to inflation may indeed bolster central banks in their policy pursuits, its influence on the policies of politically responsive authorities is likely to be even greater. Because observed inflation averages the inflation rates that would occur under complete central bank control and under complete government control of monetary policy, the financial-sector's differing inflation-impact under these polar cases can be compared. Thus, estimating a weighted-average model including effective financial opposition to inflation among the factors to which bank and government might respond differently will provide an appropriate and direct test of the epiphenomenality claim.
Summarizing, previous estimations of the inflation impact of central bank independence miss the simple but important point that observed inflation is a weighted average, so the statistical 5 Hall and Franzese (1998), Iversen (1998a) , Jonsson (1995) and Simmons (1996) , and Clark et al. (1998) consider the interaction of central bank independence with wage-bargaining institutions, with government partisanship, or with partisan/electoral cycles, but the theoretical and empirical generality of the mitigating role of central bank independence has universally been missed. Equation (1) implies all these interactions (and others). Their empirical models are also mis-specified and only slightly less so than pure linear-additive models. Relative to the models estimated here, their models are almost as inefficient as the linear-additive model; their coefficient estimates should approximate the unconstrained linear-interactive model's estimates regarding the interactions they do consider and the linear-additive model's estimates regarding all others. 11 analyses producing those estimates are mis-specified and give potentially misleading results. 
Central bank independence and inflation: the empirical models
We expect discretionary inflation to respond, inter alia, to: (a) government partisanship, G; 
C i,t is a vector of time-series controls (two lags of B i,t ) and # 1 its coefficient-vector; subscripts i and 6 Two inflation-lags sufficed in all models to capture the dynamics; no model indicated any difference in dynamics by degree of central bank independence. The 18 larger, continuously democratic OECD countries, 1972-90, comprise the sample. The flexible-exchange-rate era is chosen because, insofar as capital is mobile, fixed exchange-rates remove national monetary-policy autonomy from all but one country. Note 9 gives further methodological details. 7 b cbi,2 <-1 would imply, substantively problematically, that wholly independent central banks more than 100% mitigate other variables' inflationary impacts. Thus, restricting 0$$ cbi,2 $-1 would further improve model-specification; I ignore this complication for expositional simplicity. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, all independent variables are lagged one year. Model (4) is estimated by constrained least-squares (CLS), the others by OLS. CLS parameter estimates are found numerically since analytic solutions do not exist; the estimated coefficients' estimated variance-covariance matrix differs accordingly (Greene 1997, 453-8) .
Controlling for two lags of inflation, residual-correlation tests found no significant serial correlation remaining in the residuals. Still, I proceed cautiously, retaining the two lags and employing Newey-West autoregressive-andheteroskedasticity-consistent covariance-matrices (truncation at five lags), largely because estimating consistent variance-covariance matrices should aid regarding contemporaneous correlation (see below). Inflation dynamics do not depend on the degree of central bank independence: interactions of central bank independence with lagged inflation produced coefficients substantively near zero and statistically insignificant individually or jointly. Beck and Katz (1996) demonstrate that feasible generalized least-squares estimates of error-covariance structures that allow contemporaneous correlation are not advisable in data sets of these proportions and that estimating variance-covariance matrices consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation (panelcorrected standard-errors: PCSE's) is superior. PCSE's are complicated in CLS settings, though, so I rely on B a to bring contemporaneous correlation into the systematic component (in all models for comparability). Especially given that B a is a regressor, the Newey-West covariance matrix should aid further regarding whatever contemporaneous correlation may remain in the stochastic component.
Interactive models usually assume that coefficients on some variables are deterministic functions of others. Western (1997) notes that assuming probabilistic interactive relations makes more substantive and statistical sense, and demonstrates Bayesian techniques for estimating and analyzing such random-coefficient models. His suggestions apply here and complement the present approach emphasizing theoretically derived restrictions on the form of interactions considered. Also, Bayesian techniques would especially suit the evaluation of several possible models between mostunconstrained (5) and most-constrained (4). I advocate the combination of these approaches but, given the present emphasis on simplicity, employ only more familiar techniques here.
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[ Table 1 Adjusting for degrees of freedom, the weighted-average model fits the data better (i.e., has 11 The comparisons are not transparent from Table 1 and strongly supports all our theoretical expectations. I therefore proceed to substantive and theoretical interpretation using model (4).
Substantive and theoretical implications
First, the epiphenominality argument would imply that, controlling for other anti-inflationary influences in the polity, especially financial-sector strength, central bank independence has no remaining anti-inflationary impact. That hypothesis is rejected at p<.01 in the linear model, at p<.0005 in the unconstrained interactive model, and at p<.0000005 in the constrained weighted-13 Central banks can be (in)dependent when other factors are (not) conducive to low inflation: regressing central bank independence on government partisanship, union density, trade openness, financial-sector employment-share, and wage-bargaining coordination (decade-averages) reveals that these five factors explain maximally 50% of the variation in central bank independence. 14 b cbi,2 is close to the -1 expected if banks targeted low, constant inflation rates but differs marginally significantly (p..065, one-sided). Strictly, 0>$ cbi,2 >-1 would imply that even perfectly independent banks respond somewhat to other political-economic conditions. However, we expect b cbi,2 =-1 exactly iff central bank independence were measured perfectly, the true model were exactly a linear weighted-average with exactly these variables, and they were all measured perfectly. I therefore resist placing too much emphasis on the exact magnitude of b cbi,2 . More critical is that reasonable alternative specifications always yielded -.7<b cbi,2 <-1.2, clearly indicated approximate weightedaverage models, and overwhelmingly supported such over linear-additive models. 15 The highly interactive (4) and (5) also dominate models like Jonsson (1995) , Simmons (1996) , and Clark et al. (1998), or Hall and Franzese (1998) and Iversen (1998a) The graphic reveals an initial response in New Zealand (CBI.0.15, sample minimum) of about +2.25%, rising to almost +3.75% after three years, then settling back to about +3.4% in the long run (7 years ± by our estimates). In Finland (CBI.0.49), the estimated immediate response to the same shock is only +1.5% (±), with a peak +2.5% (±) effect, and a long-run +2.25% (±) effect.
In Germany (CBI.0.93, sample maximum), domestic inflation barely responds to such foreign developments: analogous estimates being +.57%, +.95%, +.86%. The standard linear-additive model 20 would conclude, contrarily and quite incorrectly, that all countries incurred an immediate +1.2%, peak +2.2%, and long-run +2% impetus to inflation from these events (shown in bold in Figure 1 ).
More generally, the linear-additive model simply misses the fact that more independent central banks successfully resisted more of the inflationary impulse originating from the international arena during this time (and others) than more dependent banks could.
Consider next the inflation effects of government partisanship. Our results indicate both that central bank independence has greater anti-inflationary impact under left than under right governments and that partisan differences in inflation are greater the more dependent is the central bank. This differs from the somewhat misleading conclusions derived from linear-additive models.
The linear-additive estimates imply that unit rightward shifts in government partisanship (about the distance between typical Republican-and Democratic-presidency US governments) always produce a .3% (±) inflation decrease, with a 90% confidence interval stretching from -.13% to -.45%. The weighted-average model, however, reveals that this estimate is considerably inaccurate in countries with low or high central bank independence (including the US). Where independence is extremely low, such as it was in New Zealand, the same unit rightward shift produces a .46% inflation reduction (90% c.i.= [-.24,-.68] ), while where independence is extremely high, as in Germany, unit rightward shifts only reduce inflation .12% (90% c.i. [-.03,-.20] ). Thus, ceteris paribus, identical ideological swings in New Zealand produced inflation movements over 150% as large as those estimated by the linear-additive model, while identical ideological swings in Germany produced inflation movements only about 40% as large.
Also, over most of the sample range of central bank independence, the confidence interval for the partisan impact is smaller in the weighted-average than the linear-additive model. This 16 The reported joint hypothesis test is the one least favorable to this comparison: H 0 :$ t =$ t @$ c,t =0. One could also argue, though, that H 0 :$ t =0, which produces p..019, is sufficient in model (4).
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illustrates that the more exact weighted-average specification provides more precise estimates (i.e., underestimates the substantive magnitude of those effects per se (i.e., apart from their mitigation by central bank independence). For example, in an environment with a perfectly dependent central bank, the impact of trade openness is more than twice its average impact across all types of banks as estimated by the linear-additive model. The former effect is also unambiguously significant (p..019) while the latter is more marginally so (p..056). Additionally, the mis-specification of the linear-additive model contributes to a general statistical inefficiency (i.e., higher standard errors than the lowest possible given the information in the data) which further hinders the discovery of effects which actually exist. In sum, by failing to incorporate the manner in which central bank independence mitigates the inflationary impacts of other political-economic institutional and structural factors, most previous estimates of those impacts have mis-stated them, understating their 17 However, even the linear-additive model evidenced clear partisan effects; the exclusive post-Bretton-Woods focus here may explain these stronger-than-usual results. See Clark et al. (1998) for more thorough discussion of this and related points. 18 The mitigation of partisan-inflation-cycles by central bank independence exemplifies a more general property. Whether the bank explicitly seeks to reduce inflation variance or not, inflation-variance reduction is inherent in the bank's responding less and/or to other and/or to fewer factors than does the discretionary authority. Note the inflation-variance implications of (1):
is not too positive and V(B c * ) is not too much larger than V(B d * ), central bank independence reduces inflation volatility simply because it diversifies the "portfolio" of politico-economic signals to which policy responds. Thus, the much-celebrated finding that central bank independence reduces inflation variance simply reflects that diversification moderates volatility or, even more generally, that averaging reduces variance. 22 magnitude and their certainty, and thus may have failed to find some of them.
Specifically regarding political and partisan business cycles, previous evidence of which is often viewed as weak, the implications are profound. For example, US governments with Republican presidents and those with Democratic presidents are typically about 1 point apart ideologically on our scale (6.5-5.5±, depending on the partisan composition of Congress). Thus, were the Federal Reserve perfectly dependent (CBI=0), and were typical Democratic-and Republican-president governments to oscillate in office for one term each, inflation would oscillate with an amplitude of .9% (±, ceteris paribus). If, conversely, the Fed were perfectly independent (CBI=1), inflation would barely oscillate (amplitude<.1%) in response to such government-partisanship changes. And if the Fed had 75% independence (as its CBI index-value suggests), it would mitigate the partisan-induced oscillation by about 63% [i.e., .75(-.838)], to an amplitude just over 0.3%. Scholars focusing on the US case might easily have missed that much smaller amplitude, not because partisan cycles in US monetary-policy do not exist, but because the Fed so reduces them that they are hard to discover.
The implication is that comparative political economists should expect larger (smaller) partisan cycles in inflation, ceteris paribus, where central banks are more (in-)dependent. 17, 18 Finally, compare directly the estimates of the inflation impact of central bank independence in these developed democracies from 1972-90 from the weighted-average model and from the 19 Current estimates in some countries imply that independent central banks increase inflation somewhat relative to what the (apparently extremely conservative) social and political structure would have produced itself. I take such estimates, hard to interpret substantively but thankfully rare in the sample, as indication that an anti-inflationary monetary-policy stance is over-determined in these country-times. Considering that central bank independence had become almost superfluous as an antiinflation device in these countries, why so many moved to increase it in the 1990s and not before is a puzzle. Certainly international compromises surrounding the drive to European Monetary Union are proximately central, but an intertemporal perspective on the present theory and evidence may add to that understanding of this conjunction of events. Central bank independence has little antiinflationary impact in most places now because the structure of political interests push discretionary policy-makers to pursue anti-inflationary policy anyway, which is to say that anti-inflationary forces currently hold the political edge. Central bank independence will be most needed, from their antiinflationary standpoint, should they lose this edge. Thus, recent pro-independence offensives may reflect anti-inflationary forces using their current political strength to establish or strengthen (i.e., institutionalize) their central banks' independence so that the bank might continue to serve antiinflationary interests should the structure of polity and economy turn more inflationary in the future.
This logic suggests, conversely, that when central bank independence would provide the most antiinflationary impact is exactly when it is hardest to establish because that will be when less antiinflationary forces dominate. Assuming political actors understand this dynamic and have some foresight, we would expect pro-independence forces to be on the offensive when they hold sway even though central bank independence is least necessary then and anti-independence forces to be on the offensive when they hold sway even though central bank independence would have greatest anti-inflationary impact then.
Conclusion
Theoretically, I have shown that the predictions of central-bank-independence-and-inflation 20 Western (1997) offers a complementary statistical approach which should further aid such endeavors (see note 9).
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theory are more precise (and correctly so) than previous empirical analyses have credited. The argument is not merely that central bank independence reduces inflation ceteris paribus, as previous linear-additive models have amply demonstrated. Rather, the theory states and the evidence reveals (given properly specified models) that how much central bank independence reduces inflation depends on many domestic and international, institutional and structural characteristics of the broader political-economic environment because these considerations differently affect the desired inflation-rates, and thus the monetary policies, of partially independent central banks and politically responsive governments. Conversely, the inflationary impact of any factor to which governments and central banks respond differently depends on the degree of central bank independence.
Empirically, the failure of much previous literature to specify test equations embodying these theoretical expectations resulted in mis-specification which provided estimates of only the roughaverage inflation-impacts of central bank independence and of other variables across various configurations of those other variables and central bank independence occurring in the sample country-times. Furthermore, by fostering imprecise coefficient estimates, such mis-specification may have obscured empirical relationships which actually exist (e.g., political and partisan business cycles). More broadly, the present exercise has demonstrated that the appropriate application of theoretically derived restrictions on empirical estimation can aid researchers seeking evidence regarding the complex, interactive hypotheses which are the hallmark of institutional political economy in particular and of political science in general.
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The results also suggest that moves toward greater (lesser) central bank independence may be most likely when that institution would have least (most) anti-inflationary impact. This is because 26 pro-independence forces will seek to institutionalize greater central bank independence when they are ascendant, not because it is necessary then-indeed that is when it is least necessary-but because it is possible then and may become necessary in the future when, having been established, it may prove harder to remove. Anti-independence forces should act analogously when they dominate, which will be when central bank independence would have had most anti-inflationary bite. For now, this is merely conjecture, but the notion may suggest avenues for further theoretical development in endogenizing central bank independence in particular and institutions in general.
Finally, the theory and evidence above illustrate a still broader point regarding institutional political economy. The incentives facing political-economic actors, and thus policies and outcomes, are determined by the interactions of the set of domestic and international, economic and political, and structural and institutional factors operating in that place and time. Indeed, researchers have long recognized this as true not only of political economy but of political and other social sciences more generally. Too often, however, the unavoidable limitations of social science and its data have led scholars either to abandon quantitative analysis of such complicated phenomenon altogether or to conduct quantitative analysis of more limited and therefore less general models which do not explore many of the interactions suspected to be present. This work demonstrates a fruitfully exploitable alternative compromise. We can use our theories to narrow the range and types of possible interactions over which to search, moving beyond linear-additive and linear-interactive models, and we may find it both statistically efficient and theoretically rewarding to do so. Layard, et al. (1991) . Independence (0-1) . The average of five commonly used indices: LVAU and QVAU from Cukierman (1992) , EC and POL from Grilli et al. (1991) , and the original index from Bade and Parkin (1982) . [N.b. Alesina's frequently-cited index derives from Bade and Parkin's (personal communications) .] Cukierman's LVAU and so the average potentially varies by "decade": 1950-9, 1960-72, 1973-9, 1980-9 U: Union Density (0-1). Union members as a share of labor force; Golden and Wallerstein (1995) .
CBI: Central Bank

CWB: Coordination of Wage Bargaining (0-1).
A subjective index from Hall and Franzese (1998) . The index varies by country: US=UK=Canada=Ireland=0; France=Italy=Australia=New Zealand=.25; Belgium=Netherlands=.5; Japan=Germany=Denmark=Finland=Switzerland=.75;
Austria=Norway=Sweden=1.
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